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EMINENT DOMAIN DAMAGES
J. B. ST nri.t
The question of damages in eminent domain has ever been a matter
of great controversy between litigants, and not infrequently the litigation
ends in an unjust award. Generally the popular mind looks upon con-
demnation awards with ridicule. Naturally the condemnee is exacting in
his claims; all claimants, in whatever field of damages,- ask for more than
they expect to receive, just as condemnors are reluctant to admit the
amount of damages they should pay. The late Judge Faris of the Supreme
Court of Missouri once said that damages ranged "from nothing to a
quarter of a million dollars."'
True, it often happens that condemnation awards are excessive. On
the other hand, condemnors are not without fault; in fact, they are equally
to blame with the owners. There is no excuse for a condemnor to attempt to
get property for less than its actual value; an owner is entitled to all
the value there is in his property. Condemnors' experts often negotiate
settlements that are not above reproach, and this is especially true where
an owner does not have valuation and legal advice. These experts very
often become advocates in their zeal, with the result that their errors lie
buried in public improvements as memorials of silent sacrifices of property
owners, but these errors are never discovered by the public, and, therefore,
they never become a public joke.
I. JUST COMPENSATION
Constitutions guarantee "just compensation" for property "taken
or damaged." '2  Broadly speaking, "taken" means appropriated; "dam-
aged" means not physically taken, but injured, depreciated in value, and
essentially the taking of rights and uses from property. Property is dam-
aged by being reduced in area and by change in grade in all forms, as
*Attorney, St. Louis. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1912. Former Con-
demnation Commissioner, St. Louis Circuit Court, 1934-1937.
1. St. Louis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 272 Mo. 80, 85, 197 S. W. 107,
109 (1917).
2. Mo. CONST. art. II, § 21. "That private property shall not be taken
or damaged for public use without just compensation."
(166)
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impairment of access, cutting off of access, or the removal of lateral sup-
port. The damaging of property gave rise to the terms "consequential
damages" and "proximate damages.'' 3 These damage elements, being a
natural development of the exercise of the power of eminent domain,
found constitutional sanction in state constitutions in 18704 in the "dam-
age clause." In addition to grade damages, the "damage clause" insures
protection to the owner whose property is damaged by reason of a portion
thereof being taken and the remainder thereby being reduced in area.
The damaging of remainders, being complicated and not always under-
stood, constitutes a field of eminent domain damages wherein property
owners sustain the most uncompensated damages.
The purpose of this article is to study the fundamental elements of
eminent domain damages and the application of the market value rule as
a means of arriving at just compensation.
The language of the federal' and several state6 constitutional provi-
sions guaranteeing just compensation and due process of law7 is substantial-
ly identical. Just compensation is comprehensive of all elements of value8
as of the time the owner is deprived of his property.9 It is the ful and
fair equivalent of the property taken,10 and that value is measured by
what the owner has lost. 1 It includes the value of the land taken and
3. United States v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 82 F. (2d) 131, 134, 136 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1936); ef. notes 90, 94, 95 and 97, infra, and text supported thereby.
4. Spencer v. Point Pleasant & Ohio R. R., 23 W. Va. 406, 428 (1884),
cited in Heorath v. Halpin, 227 Mo. App. 984, 60 S. W. (2d) 744 (1933).
5. U. S. CONST., Fifth Amendment: ". . . nor shall private property
be taken for public use without just compensation."
6. For example, Mo. CoNsr. art. II, § 21, see note 2, supra.
7. U.S. CONST., Fifth Amendment: "No person shall be . . . deprived
of . . . property without due process of law;" Fourteenth Amendment:
" . nor shall any State deprive any person of . . . property without
due process of law." MO. CONsT. art. II, § 30: "That no person shall be deprived
of . . . property without due process of law." A discussion of these dupli-
cations in the federal and state constitutions is found in Hager v. Reclamation
District, 111 U. S. 701, 707 (1884).
8. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13, 16 (1933).
9. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299, 306 (1923).
In Illinois the date of valuation is the date of filing the petition for the reason
that the owner is not entitled to the increased value resulting from the cause.
Sanitary District v. Chapin, 226 Ill. 499, 503, 80 N. E. 1017, 1019 (1907). Under
the Missouri railroad cases it is the time of the appropriation. Chicago, Mil-
waukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Randolph Town-Site Co., 103 Mo. 451, 461, 15 S. W.
437, 439 (1890). In that case, however, the court indicated that the date might
be fixed by statute. Statutes fixing dates of valuation have been held valid. In
California and Utah the date of the issuance of the summons has been approved
by the courts. California Southern R. R. v. Kimball, 61 Cal. 90 (1882); Los
Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 57 Pac. 585, 602 (1899); Oregon Short Line
& Utah Northern Ry. v. Mitchell, 7 Utah 505, 27 Pac. 693 (1891). In New
Jersey the date of the filing of the petition was held proper. Ross v. Palisades
Interstate Park, 90 N. J. L. 461, 101 At. 60, 63 (1917).
10. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 326 (1893).
11. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 574 (1897); Boston Chamber of Com-
1941]
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the depreciated value of the remainder. 2 It was held to be market value
in Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Payallup."
In the old case of Sinnickson v. Johnson, 4 it was held to be a settled
principle of universal law, reaching back prior to all constitutions, that
the right to compensation was co-ordinate with the power of eminent do-
main. Just compensation is natural justice.
II. DuE PROCESS oF LAw
Due process of law also requires that the owner be paid the full value
of his property. In Smyth v. Ames, 5 the court held that a judgment of a
state court is wanting in due process of law, under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, if property is taken without just compensation. In McCoy v. Union
Elevated R. R.,16 the court said that if the necessary result was to deprive
a man of his property without just compensation, then due process of
law was denied. In addition to the payment of just compensation, due
process of law requires that the procedure shall not make it impossible to
obtain just compensation. The instrumentalities of the state must pro-
vide for due process of law, as the court held in Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R. R. v. Chicago 7 Notice and opportunity to defend are essential
parts of the procedure. 8 At some stage in the proceedings there must
be an opportunity to be heard.' 9 No judgment of a court without notice
merce v. Boston, 217 U. S. 189, 195 (1910); United States v. Chicago, B. & Q.
R. R., 82 F. (2d) 131, 135 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936); Commonwealth v. Begley, 114
S. W. (2d) 127, 129 (Ky. App. 938).
12. Fitzsimons & Galvin v. Rogers, 243 Mich. 649, 220 N. W. 881 886
(1928); Crum v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp., 124 Cal. App. 90, 12 P. (2d) 13, 135
(1932); Heorath v. Halpin, 227 Mo. App. 984, 60 S. W. (2d) 744, 745 (1933);
Lemon v. Garden of Eden Drainage District, 310 Mo. 171, 275 S. W. 44, 46 (1925).
13. 51 F. (2d) 688, 690 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931); Talbot v. Norfolk, 158
Va. 387, 163 S. E. 100, 101 (1932).
14. 17 N. J. L. 129, 145 (1839).
15. 169 U. S. 466, 525-6 (1898); Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Chicago, 166
U. S. 226, 241 (1897). In United States v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 82 F. (2d)
131, 134, 140 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936), the Court held that the condemnee must be
made whole for what was taken from him. In Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v.
Naperville, 166 Ill. 87, 47 N. E. 734, 736 (1897), the court in speaking ofjust compensation said: "Unless the owner is made whole, he would not re-
ceive the compensation which the constitution guarantees him." This case was
followed in St. Louis v. Brown, 155 Mo. 545, 56 S. W. 298, 302 (1900). See
latter part of note 31, infra.
16. 247 U. S. 354, 363, 365 (1918), and cases therein cited. In that case
the question was whether the assessment of benefits by reason of the construc-
tion of an elevated railroad deprived an abutting owner of property without
due process of law. Held it did not. The evidence showed the elevated brought
a vast amount of traffic to said property.
17. 166 U. S. 226, 241 (1897).
18. Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S. 427, 436 (1901).
19. Webster, in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 581 (U. S.
1819), said: "By the law of the land is most clearly intended the general law:
[Vol. 6
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amounts to due process.2 The state cannot confiscate property even when
used in the violation of the criminal laws,2 nor can a street or road be
extended across a railroad right of way by trustees of the town except by
condemnation proceedings. 22  In St. Louis v. Hill,2" it was held that a
building line could not be established without condemnation and notice
to the owners affected, but in the recent case of Gorieb v. Fox,24 a building
line was established under the police power. In Barker v. St. Louis Coun-
ty,25 the statute which required the owner to file his claim for damages
within a specified time or be forever barred, was held unconstitutional as
contravening the clause guaranteeing just compensation. The court in
State ex rel. Mcaskill v. Hall,28 refused to require condemnation com-
missioners to allocate the award of damages between the lessor and lessees.
That was merely a matter of distribution for the court after the final
determination of the damages.27
a law which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and rendersjudgment only after trial. The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his
. . . property . . . under the protection of the general rules which
govern society." See Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 535 (1884); Wilcox
v. Phillips, 260 Mo. 664, 169 S. W. 55, 58 (1914). The commissioners were not
required to give property owners a hearing in St. Joseph v. Geiwitz, 148 Mo.
210, 49 S. W. 1000 (1899), but the statute gave them the right to file exceptions
to the report of the commissioners. In St. Louis v. Senter Commission Co., 336
Mo. 1209, 84 S. W. (2d) 133, 139 (1935.), .where the statute did not provide
for a hearing on benefits before commissioners, it was held constitutional.
However, an opportunity was given for filing exceptions.
20. Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, 46 (1894).
21. Lowry v. Rainwater, 70 Mo. 152, 159 (1879), in which the taking was
by legislative act. Legislative powers with respect to condemnation proceedings
are discussed in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312,
327 (1893).
22. St. Louis & S. F. R. R. v. Gordon, 157 Mo. 71, 57 S. W. 742, 745 (1900).
See both opinions in Delaware, L. & W. R. R. v. Morristown, 276 U. S. 182, 193,
194 (1928).
23. 116 Mo. 527, 22 S. W. 861, 863 (1893).
24. 274 U. S. 603, 607 (1927).
25. 104 S. W. (2d) 371, 376-7 (1937), rev'g, Petet v. McClanahan, 297 Mo.
677, 249 S. W. 917 (1923). By mere inaction the owner was deprived of his
property, but the court in Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 (1897),
held that the instrumentalities of the state must provide due process of law.
The court commented on the fact that a person may waive trial by jury, citing
and discussing Hecker v. Bleish, 327 Mo. 377, 37 S. W. (2d) 444, 447 (1931),
but the waiving of the trial by jury is not waiving one's cause of action. See
Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 7840.
The simplicity of the procedure before a condemnation commission in Mis-
souri is well expressed by the court in State ex rel. Union Electric Light &
Power Co. v. Bruce, 334 Mo. 312, 317, 66 S. W. (2d) 847, 849 (1933), as follows:
"A landowner whose property is sought to be condemned may sit idly by, file
no pleadings and permit the suit to progress until the commissioners make their
award. If he be satisfied with the award he has the right to accept it and go
his way without any expense whatsoever. If he is not satisfied with the award
he has the right to file exceptions and demand a jury."
26. 325 Mo. 165, 28 S. W. (2d) 80 (1930).
27. In St. Louis v. Senter Commission Co., 233 Mo. App. 804, 108 S. W.(2d) 1070 (1937), in a matter of distribution the court held that the lessee is
entitled to the reasonable market value of the unexpired term of his leasehold.
This case is ably discussed by Rehm in (1938) 3 Mo. L. REv. 203.
1941]
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III. MEASURE OF DAMAGES
The sole question to be decided, saith the courts, is, what is just com-
pensation?28 The question appears to be simple, yet the courts do not
always agree. Much depends on a clear understanding as to what is taken,
invaded, damaged, or whether certain injuries grow out of governmental
functions such as the construction of revetments along the bank and within
the bed of a navigable stream, all of which elements are hereinafter dis-
cussed. As a means of determining just compensation, time and experience
have developed the market value rule with which to measure the damages
sustained by property owners. That rule, as stated by Lewis, 20 is as fol-
lows:
"The market value of property is the price which it will
bring when it is offered for sale by one who desires, but is not
obliged to sell it, and is bought by one who is under no necessity
of having it."
Without quoting at length from the author, it is enough to say that
there must not be any element of a forced sale in the transaction. It must
represent a transaction on the free, open market. This definition is general-
ly accepted by all the courts.30 Where a parcel of property does not
have a market value its actual value may be shown, and the absence of
market value does not absolve the condemnor from paying just compen-
sation.31 Where part of a parcel is taken, the measure of damages is
28. McCandless v. United States, 298 U. S. 342, 348 (1936); United
States v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 82 F. (2d) 131, 134 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936).
29. LEwis, EMINENT DoMAIN (3d ed. 1909) § 706, p. 1227.
30. Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246 (1934); Roberts v. New York
City, 295 U. S. 264 (1935); Morton Butler Timber Co. v. United States, 91
F. (2d) 884, 891 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937); Forest Preserve District v. Hahn, 341
fll. 599, 173 N. E. 763 (1930); actual value as fixed by statute was held to be
market value in State v. Lee, 103 Mont. 482, 63 P. (2d) 135 (1936); Baucum
v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 179 Ark. 154, 15 S. W. (2d) 399 (1929);
Tulsa v. Creeknore, 167 Okla. 298, 29 P. (2d) 101 (1934); Maher v. Common-
wealth, 291 Mass. 343, 197 N. E. 78 (1935); Metropolitan Street Railway Co.
v. Walsh, 197 Mo. 392, 94 S. W. 860 (1906), a leading case in Missouri; In re
New York, Ward's Island, 158 Misc. 684, 286 N. Y. Supp. 131 (1936); Lebanon
& Nashville Turnpike Co. v. Creveling, 159 Tenn. 147, 17 S. W. (2d) 22 (1928);
State v. Carpenter, 126 Tex. 604, 89 S. W. (2d) 979 (1936); Commonwealth
v. Begley, 272 Ky. 289, 114 S. W. (2d) 127, 129 (1938).
31. In Idaho-Western Ry. v. Columbia Synod, 20 Idaho 568, 119 Pac. 60,
62 (1911), where there was no market value in a college building, the owner was
allowed such compensation as would be a substitute for the property taken. In
Stockton v. Ellingwood, 96 Cal. App. 708, 275 Pac. 228 (1929), it was held
that absence of market' did not absolve the condemnor from paying compensa-
tion, but an owner must suffer a loss in order to receive compensation. Los
Angeles v. Harper, 139 Cal. App. 331, 33 P. (2d) 1029 (1934). In Illinois
Light & Power Co. v. Bedard, 343 Ill. 618, 175 N. E. 851, 852 (1931), the
-court held that a church, college, cemetery, club house or railroad terminal
-did not have a market value, in which case the law permitted the introduction
of any evidence available to prove values. In Waco v. Craven, 54 S. W. (2d)
[Vol. 6
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the difference in market value before and after the appropriation. 2 This
rule applies to buildings just as it applies to land, for buildings are part
of the land,33 and therefore they cannot be valued separate and apart from
the land. With a building the question is, what enhancement in the
market value does the building add to the property? Houses are part
of the realty and must be paid for as realty.35  For the same reason, if a
part of a building is taken it must be paid for and the title passes to the
condemnor.36
In connection -with the taking of part of a building, the remainder
should be restored unless the taking of the part destroys the whole of it.
If the remainder building is still usuable, it must be restored, or else it
is destroyed. Hence, the necessity of constructing a new front wall on
the remainder building. Restoration is the practical compensatory method
883, 887 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), it was held that where property had no
market value, the actual value could be shown.
In this connection we refer to note 15, supr&, where several cases are cited
to show that the owner must be made whole, otherwise he does not receive just
compensation. Where all of a parcel is taken, the market value equivalent,
would make the owner whole; but where property does not have a market
value, the owner is made whole by paying him for his loss, or actual value.
In cases where the remainder is damaged and where restoration is required, the
owner is made whole by paying him the cost of restoration. The question
becomes, what is the cost of restoration, not market value. Restoration is a
construction matter entirely. Take the case of United States v. Chicago, B. &
Q. R. R., notes 98 and 99, infra, and the text supported thereby, where it
became necessary to estimate the value and cost of raising and broadening
the railroad embankment and of protecting it from erosion, saturation, and dis-
tortion from waves and ice by riprapping with rock, there was no application
of the market value rule. On page 138 the court pointed out that the market
value rule did not apply to the situation, and it became necessary to make the
property whole for the loss sustained. The question was not asked as to
whether the restoration costs equalled or were greater than the value of the
property damaged. The question was, what was the cost and damage for re-
storing the property to as good a condition as it was in prior to the damage
committed by the condemnor?
32. City Water Co. v. Hunter, 319 Mo. 1240, 6 S. W. (2d) 565, 567 (1928);
Maxwell v. Iowa State Highway Comm., 223 Iowa 159, 271 N. W. 883 (1937);
Alabama Power Co. v. Berry, 222 Ala. 20, 130 So. 541, 544 (1930); Malvern &
Ouachita River R. R. v. Smith, 181 Ark. 626, 26 S. W. (2d) 1107 (1930);
Munson v. MacDonald, 113 Conn. 651, 155 Atl. 910 (1931); Commonwealth v.
Combs, 244 Ky. 204, 50 S. W. (2d) 497, 499 (1932); Grand Rapids v. Barth,
248 Mich. 13, 226 N. W. 690 (1929); Laureldale Cemetery Co. v. Reading Co.,
303 Pa. 315, 154 Atl. 372 (1931).
33. Newgass v. Railway Co., 54 Ark. 140, 146, 15 S. W. 188 (1891),
followed in Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Second Street Improvement Co.,
256 Mo. 386, 404, 166 S. W. 296, 301 (1914). In State ex rel. State Highway
Comm. v. Haid, 332 Mo. 606, 59 S. W. (2d) 1057, 1059 (1933), the court said:
S. the house, barn, and fences, being fixtures to the land condemned .
pass to the condemnor .
34. St. Louis v. Turner, 331 Mo. 834, 55 S. W. (2d) 942, 944 (1932);
Saathoff v. State Highway Comm., 146 Kan. 465, 72 P. (2d) 74 (1937).
35. Kansas City v. Morse, 105 Mo. 510, 519, 16 S. W. 893, 895 (1891).
36. Ibid. There the court said: "Buildings taken, in whole or in part,
are to be treated as realty so far as they are taken or damaged." See St. Louis
v. Abeln, 170 Mo. 318, 70 S. W. 708 (1902).
1941]
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of making the remainder usuable and of paying the damages or cost there-
of.37 Restoration here is not market value; it is a means of saving from
destruction the value that is in the remainder building. Even after the
new front is restored, the remainder building may still have sustained a
consequential damage by reason of reduced space and usable area.
IV. CHANGE IN GRADE
In this phase of eminent domain damages the change is from the
natural, or former established grade, to the new grade.38  The land
is not taken in the sense of a physical taking, although it amounts to a
taking in that the land affected is depreciated in value. This damage
arises from the raising or lowering of the grade along the property abutting
on a street. Change in grade cuts off access, or removes lateral support.
In such cases the property may be restored in the residential districts by
building terraces and in the industrial sections by constructing retaining
walls. The cost of restoration is generally taken as adequate in such cases.
However, the measure of damages is the difference in the market value
of the property before and after the grade change has been completed, in-
eluding also damages to the improvements. 30 Complete restoration will
make the property whole and usable, but the rule may not admit of dam-
ages for complete restoration. In Smith v. Kansas City,40 where the
lowering of the street left the residence over fourteen feet above the new
street, the court said:
"The general rule is, that when the reasonable cost of repair-
ing the injury by restoring the premises to their former condition,
as near as may be, is less than the diminution in the market value
37. The court, in Springfield Southwestern Ry. v. Schweitzer, 173 Mo.
App. 650, 158 S. W. 1058, 1060 (1913), in commenting on St. Louis v. Abeln,
said: "A part of the wall of a building was torn down, which, if left down,
would necessarily render almost valueless the part of the building not taken,
and the court allowed the cost of rebuilding the wall for the purpose of reducing
the damage to the property not taken." Similar rulings are found in West
Chicago Masonic Ass'n v. Chicago, 215 Ill. 278, 74 N. E. 159, 161 (1905); In re
Widening of Michigan Avenue, 280 Mich. 539, 273 N. W. 798, 802 (1937); Sho-
walter v. Arizona, 48 Ariz. 523, 63 P. (2d) 189, 190 (1936). Even as far back
as 1838 the cost of a new wall was allowed as damages in Patterson v. Boston,
37 Mass. 159 (1838).
38. Smith v. St. Joseph, 122 Mo. 643, 27 S. W. 344 (1894): Hickman v.
Kansas City, 120 Mo. 110, 25 S. W. 225, 227 (1894); Nestlehut v. DeSoto, 202
S. W. 425, 426 (Mo. App. 1918).
39. Nestlehut v. DeSoto, 202 S. W. 425, 426 (Mo. App. 1918), and cases
therein cited.
40. 128 Mo. 23, 31, 30 S. W. 314, 316 (1895). The owner introduced evi-
dence tending to show a damage of about $6,000.00, based on lowering the
grade of the lot and building to the same relative position to the new grade
as it occupied prior to the change. The City denied any liability for damages.
The verdict was for $2,750.00.
(Vol. 6
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of the property by reason of the injury, such cost of restoration is
the proper measure of damages."
If the cost of restoration is less than the diminution in the market value
of the property, then the cost of restoration is the proper measure of
damages, but the physical facts present a practical situation where the
change in the grade leaves a residence fourteen feet above the new street
level. In such a case there are two possible ways of restoring the property:
one is to build a retaining wall that will hold up the lot and building, and
the other is to lower the lot and building to the same relative grade above
the new street as it stood above the street prior to the change. Nothing
short of the latter plan will adequately compensate the owner for the
damages he sustains. If the rule in Smith v. Kansas City is followed strict-
ly, it will in many instances deprive the owner of his property without
just compensation. The owner is entitled to have his property left in as
good a condition after the work is completed as it was prior thereto, but
no better except where new material and new construction work would
make the property better. Private property is not usuable if it is not ac-
cessible to streets. If cost of restoration is to be the measure of damages
in such cases, then the amount of damages should be ample fully to restore
the property to its former condition, otherwise the property owner is
not made whole for the losses sustained and he is deprived of his property
without just compensation. This rule applies to all property without
regard to location or type of construction. The Constitution makes no
distinction as to character of property in restoration.40 a
The right of access to property is an easement which cannot be taken
away or impaired without just compensation. 41 The right of access in-
cludes the right to stop in front of the owner's premises. 42  It is the right
to have his "family, guests or customers come and go with reasonable
limitations" and without interference except by reasonable traffic regula-
tions. Neither statute nor ordinance may require or permit the use of a
public street in such a manner "as to destroy rights of ingress or egress
to property abutting" on a street without just compensation.4 3
40a. See notes 15 and 31 and text supported by note 99 in regard to
making the property owner whole by restoration.
41. Bourg v. Manufacturer's Ry., 245 S. W. 43, 44 (Mo. 1922). In Siemers
v. St. Louis Electric Terminal Ry., 343 Mo. 1201, 125 S. W. (2d) 865, 868(1938), the court said: ". . . that continued, though temporary, deprivation
of access to the building, resulting in loss of rents or use, which there was
evidence tending to show, is an element of damage properly for consideration."
42. Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson Realty Co., 233 Ala. 352, 172 So.
114, 123 (1937); (1928) 44 C. J. § 3711.
43. Versteeg v. Wabash R. R., 250 Mo. 61, 156 S. W. 689 (1913). The
1941]
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If change of grade cuts off access, or removes the lateral support of
an abutting owner, a cause of action arises. The Supreme Court of
MAissouri, in Siemers v. St. Louis Electric Terminal Ry.,"4 quoting from
In re Board of Rapid Transit R. R. Commissioners,45 recently said:
"An abutting owner is entitled to lateral support or compen-
sation for its destruction, as against a municipality which is
constructing a subway. . . . And a city on taking the land or
an easement of an abutting owner for the purpose of constructing
a subway under the street, must compensate him for the cost of
deeper and stronger foundations to his buildings necessitated by
reason of the loss of lateral support."
The court pointed out that the rule governing lateral support between
adjoining owners does not apply where the municipality removes the
lateral support. In such cases justice demands that adequate retaining
walls be required to support the abutting property.
There are times -when the market may cause prices to soar and the
condemnor may have to pay dearly. In United States v. New River Col-
lieries Co.,4" during the World War export coal sold considerably higher
on the market than domestic coal. The Government requisitioned 60,000
tons, and urged in the trial court that proof of the real value of the coal,
instead of the market value, should govern; that market value and just
compensation were not necessarily synonymous. The trial court ruled
against the Government, and the Supreme Court said:
"This ruling was right, because it was shown beyond contro-
versy that there were market prices previously when and where
the coal was taken . . . The owner was not entitled to more
and could not be required to take less (than the market value).
The owner's cost, profit or loss did not tend to prove market price
or value at the time of taking, and was therefore immaterial."
It is no part of the application of the market value rule to pay for
moving a building to the remainder of the parcel not taken in the proceed-
ings. Damages for "moving" were not allowed in St. Louis v. Koch.47
railroad charter, created by legislative act (1851), and acquired by the Wabash,
authorized the company to use and appropriate streets without liability, and
the St. Louis City ordinance (1890) gave permission to operate a railroad in
Collins Street, from Carr to Biddle, forty feet wide with sidewalks on either
side eight feet wide, leaving a street twenty-four feet wide in front of plain-
tiff's property.
44. 343 Mo. 1201, 125 S: W. (2d) 865, 868 (1938).
45. 197 N. Y. 81, 90 N. E. 456 (1909).
46. 262 U. S. 341, 344 (1923).
47. 76 S. W. (2d) 398 (Mo. 1934). The court followed Kansas City v.
Morse, 105 Mo. 51, 16 S. W. 893, 895 (1891), adopting the rule thus stated:
"The cost of removing the houses has nothing to do with the measure of dam-
ages, for they become the property of the city so far as they are taken by the
city." State v. Miller, 92 S. W. (2d) 1073 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), held such a
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The city in that case tried to justify moving on the theory of minimizing
damages, but there is no such rule in condemnation. The question is,
what is the value of the property before and after the damage is done ?4TO
A building cannot be paid for on the basis of moving unless the owner
consents thereto, in which event the damages agreed to is in the nature
of a compromise award instead of the market value.
V. LEASEHOLD INTERESTS
The determination of damages is comparatively simple where the
whole parcel is taken. This is also true if the parcel is subject to lease,
although there may be numerous parties interested in either the reversion
or the leasehold estate. The damage award covers the whole property,
and only one award need be made by the commission or jury.48 While an
award cannot be enhanced by the number of parties interested, it may
possibly be affected in some rare instances by the leasehold. 49  It must be
remembered that the public right to condemn is exercised upon the land
itself -without regard to the ownership of the interests therein.50 and the
court will not, therefore, compel commissioners to allocate an award be-
tween the parties.51 However, all parties having or claiming an interest
rule would be intolerable; cf. Department of Public Works v. McBride, 338 Ill.
347, 170 N. E. 295 (1930). The case of Brown v. United States, 263 U. S. 78,
83 (1923), is justified by reason of a special statute, the Sundry Civil Act of
March 4, 1921, which authorized the condemnation of land for a new town
site to replace three-fourths of the town (American Falls, Idaho) taken for
the purpose of a reservoir as part of a government irrigation project. Held
the "method of compensation by substitution would seem to be the best means
of making the parties whole. The power of condemnation is necessary to such
a substitution." The court cited as a close analogy, the case of Pitznogle v.
Western Maryland R. R., 119 Md. 673, 87 Atl. 917 (1913), where the company
condemned an additional strip of land for a roadway as a substitute for another
roadway taken as a part of the land condemned for railroad purposes. Held
that such a taking was justified on the ground of public necessity.
47a. See text supported by notes 32-37, supra.
48. The parties have the same interest in the award that they had in the
property. Peterson v. Minneapolis, 175 Minn. 300, 221 N. W. 14 (1928);
Schill v. Essex County, 98 N. J. Eq. 469, 131 Atl. 584 (1926); St. Louis v.
Rossi, 333 Mo. 1092, 64 S. W. (2d) 600, 604 (1933), and cases therein cited.
49. In State ex rel. McCaskill v. Hall, 325 Mo. 165, 28 S. W. (2d) 80, 82(1930), the court pointed out that there might be exceptional circumstances
where the values of the various interests would exceed the value of the whole,
in which instances said interests should be separately appraised, citing but
refusing to follow Baltimore v. Latrobe, 101 Md. 621, 61 Atl. 203, 205 (1905);
see St. Louis v. Rossi, 333 Mo. 1092, 64 S. W. (2d) 600, 607 (1933). The
McCaskill case (note the discussion of the Latrobe case) recognizes there may
be exceptions to the general rule. An instance of such an exception wo'ild be
where the land is leased to a responsible concern at a high rental, and such
land would necessarily sell for more on the market than adjoining land not
so fortunately leased. Instances of this character are very rare.
50. Edmands v. Boston, 108 Mass. 535, 544 (1871).
51. State ez rel. McCaskill v. Hall, 325 Mo. 165, 28 S. W. (2d) 80 (1930).
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in the property must be made defendants in order to acquire their in-
terests, unless the proceeding is strictly in reM. 2
But where land proposed to be taken is under lease with fixtures in-
stalled by the lessee, the measure of damages becomes more complex. How-
ever, much of the differences in opinions may be distinguished on the basis
of facts. In Hanna v. County of Hampden, 3 a tenant at will was held to
have no estate that entitled him to damages. It is fundamental that dam-
ages can only be awarded for land, buildings and fixtures! 4 Where a
tenant installs fixtures on the demised premises and the lease ends pending
the condemnation proceedings, the lessee is not entitled to damages.r The
52. Parties having an interest in property must be made defendants.
State ex rel. Siegel v. Grimm, 314 Mo. 242, 284 S. W. 490 (1926). This is ele-
mentary in any jurisdiction. A mortgagee or lienholder is a proper party.
Morgan v. Willman, 318 Mo. 151, 1 S. W. (2d) 193, 200 (1927). An exception
would be where the proceedings are in rem. North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman,
268 U. S. 276, 285 (1925); Rudacille v. State Commission on Conservation, 155
Va. 808, 156 S. E. 829 (1931) ; In re Condemnation of Property for Park, 263
S. W. 97, 100 (Mo. 1924); Elsberry Drainage Dist. v. Harris, 267 Mo. 139,
184 S. W. 89, 91 (1916).
53. 250 Mass. 107, 145 N. E. 258 (1924). In Tate v. State Highway
Comm., 226 Mo. App. 1216, 1220, 49 S. W. (2d) 282, 284 (1932), the court in
reviewing many authorities said: ". . . a tenancy at will is incapable of
being the subject-matter of a sale," and therefore it has no market value. The
court distinguished the case from Sheehan v. Fall River, 187 Mass. 356, 73
N. E. 544 (1905), where a tenant at will was the owner of a valuable building,
with the right of removal. The property was damaged on account of change
of grade, a damage to the possession and not a taking or acquisition of property.
54. Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Second Street Improvement Co., 256
Mo. 386, 404, 166 S. W. 296, 301 (1914) ; of. St. Louis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry.,
266 Mo. 694, 182 S. W. 750, 752 (1916) ; LEwIS, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. 1909)§ 728.
55. In Schreiber v. Chicago & Evanston R. R., 115 Ill. 340, 3 N. E. 427
(1885), where the tenant installed certain fixtures considered by the court as
trade fixtures, and the lease expired before the payment of the award, the
court held the tenant was not entitled to damages because he was not dispossessed
by the condemnation proceedings. He had an obligation to move at the end of
the term. In Cincinnati v. Schmidt, 14 Ohio App. 426 (1921), the city con-
demned the fee simple title to the land, and the tenants were permitted to
remain in possession after the title had passed to the city and until after the
expiration of the lease. The buildings were owned by tenants who leased the
premises from year to year with the privilege of removal. Held the tenants
were not entitled to compensation. In Smith v. Jeffcoat, 196 Ala. 96, 71 So.
717 (1916), the tenant held under a lease entered into after the condemnation
suit had been filed, and the court held the tenant was not entitled to damages,
his rights being subject to said suit. In the case of Los Angeles County Flood
Control District v. Andrews, 52 Cal. App. 788, 205 Pac. 1085 (1921), the lessee
claimed damages under a lease with an option for renewal. Held the option
gave no right of possession, which, of course, was a rather strict construction.
The lease expired on June 1, 1919, and the date of valuation was March 20, 1919,
the date of the issuance of summons, which date, the lessee claimed, entitled him
to damages. Held "the rule that damages are to be assessed . . . as of the
date of the issuance of summons relates only to property actually taken," but
no property was taken because the lessee remained in possession until the end
of his term.
The Schreiber case was followed in the three preceding cases to sustain the
rulings. To these authorities may be added LEWIS, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed.
1909) § 719, and the case of Wright v. Logan, 25 S. W. (2d) 799, 802 (Mo.
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fixtures thus attached to an expired leasehold do not constitute an ele-
ment of damages, but where a tenant for a term of years installs fixtures
on the premises, they can be considered to the extent to which they in-
crease the market value of the unexpired term of the leasehold.0 These
fixtures contribute to the increased rental value of the property.5 7 The
value of the lessor's interest in the property is fixed by the rent reserved
in the lease, and the increment of value in the property goes to the lessee.
This is especially true in long term leases.
It would appear from the decisions that trade fixtures attach to the
leasehold 8 rather than to the freehold. In contemplation of law, trade
App. 1930), which held that an option for five-year extension of the lease was
as much a part of the lease as any other matters therein. This ruling is, of
course, contra to the Andrews case.
56. In Emery v. Boston Terminal Co., 178 Mass. 172, 185, 59 N. E. 763
(1901), the tenant, dispossessed on April 5th, twenty-one days prior to the
end of the lease, on May 21st, was entitled to damages for the use of the property
and fixtures during the unexpired term. The mere fact that the lessor had for
several years regularly renewed the lease could not be considered for purposes
of further renewals with the tenant. Such possible intentions of the parties
added nothing to the legal rights of the tenant. It is legal rights that must be
paid for. "Even if such intention be added to the salable value of the lease,
the addition would represent a speculation on a chance, not a legal right."
In Pause v. Atlanta, 98 Ga. 92, 26 S. E. 489 (1895), the court said: "The
increased value of the premises for rent in consequence of the putting in of such
fixtures . . . may properly be considered in computing the damages to the
leasehold." In Bales v. Wichita Midland Valley R. R., 92 Kan. 771, 141 Pac.
1009 (1914), the award to a tenant was based on the fact that certain fixtures
increased the value of the lease. In Consolidated Ice Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R.,
224 Pa. 487, 494, 73 Atl. 937 (1909), the railroad purchased the fee and filed
a condemnation suit to acquire the lessee's interest in the premises. The railroad
company removed and sold certain fixtures (ice house and machinery) installed
by the tenant who had refused to move them. Held, the railroad was liable for
the unexpired term of the lease plus the sale price realized from the machinery.
The value of the use of the fixtures until the expiration of the lease was included
in estimating the value of the unexpired leasehold. See Iron City Auto Co.
v. Pittsburgh, 253 Pa. 478, 98 Atl. 679 (1916), for a review of authorities on
leaseholds and fixtures. In St. Louis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 266 Mo. 694,
182 S. W. 750, 754 (1916), where the respondent's unexpired term was three years,
the court held "respondent was entitled to be paid the reasonable market value
of its fixtures . . . which were contained in and affixed to the leasehold
premises condemned."
57. (1920) 20 C. J. § 194; NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1917) 717,§ 234. In North Coast R. R. v. Kraft, 63 Wash. 250, 115 Pac. 97, 100 (1911),
the court held the cost of moving fixtures was admissible only to show the
value of the lease. See Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry Co. v. Des Moines, 197
Iowa 1082, 198 N. W. 486 (1924); Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v.
Anderson, 52 Cal. App. 788, 205 Pac. 1085 (1921). Courts generally hold that
compensation will not be paid for, or for moving of loose, movable, personal
property. Springfield Southwestern Ry. v. Schweitzer, 173 Mo. App. 650, 158
S. W. 1058, 1059 (1913); Potomac Electric Power Co. v. United States, 85 F.
(2d) 243, 249 (1936). Cf. St. Louis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 266 Mo. 694,
182 S. W. 750 (1916).
58. In re West, 253 Fed. 963, 966 (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1918); Winike v. Heyman,
185 Iowa 114, 169 N. W. 631 (1918); Waverly Park Amusement Co. v. Michigan
United Traction Co., 197 Mich. 92, 163 N. W. 917, 919 (1917); Ray v. Young,
160 Iowa 613, 142 N. W. 393 (1913); Alden v. Mayfield, 163 Cal. 793, 127
Pac. 44, 45 (1912); Red Diamond Clothing Co. v. Steidemann, 169 Mo. App.
306, 152 S. W. 609, 615 (1912).
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fixtures are the lessee's equipment and are not considered as annexed to
the freehold, although they are sufficiently attached to the premises to
serve the purposes of the tenant. It is generally the intention of the par-
ties that the tenants will move his fixtures at the end of his term.
VT. LAND, BuiLDING AND FixTuREs
The term "fixture" has always been difficult to define. It may be
safely said that a fixture depends upon three elements, namely, annexation,
adaptation and intention.59  Annexation, however slight and easily dis-
placed, will-not prevent an article becoming a fixture where it is adapted
to its location in the building with the intention of becoming a part there-
of.60 The tendency is for adaptation and intention to control in the test,
and not annexation. So, a manufacturing plant where parts of the equip-
ment installed by the owner are only slightly fastened to the premises, and
some not at all, is, considered as a unit and as a going concern, held to be a
fixture.6
1
59. Crane Co. v. Epworth Hotel Const. & Real Estate Co., 121 Mo. App.
209, 219, 98 S. W. 795 (1906); Security Stove & Mfg. Co. v. Stevens, 222 Mo.
App. 1029, 1034, 9 S. W. (2d) 808, 811 (1928) ; Glueck & Co. v. Powell, 227 Mo.
App. 1226, 61 S. W. (2d) 406, 408 (1933). The old rule of annexation is found
in Potomac Electric Power Co. v. United States, 85 F. (2d) 243, 248 (1936),
where the court said: "The rule applicable to so-called fixtures in buildings
taken in federal condemnations is that, if they can be removed without substan-
tial injury either to the real estate or to the fixtures, they remain personalty and
need not be taken as part of the realty." The court there overlooked both
adaptation and intention. The omission of intention from an instruction in Cooke
v. McNeil, 49 Mo. App. 81, 84 (1892), was error. In Moller-Vandenboom Lbr.
Co. v. Boudreau, 231 Mo. App. 1127, 85 S. W. (2d) 141, 149 (1935), it was held
that brooder houses were fixtures because it was the intention that they were
to remain there. Incidentally, the federal courts follow the state courts in the
law of fixtures. Randall v. LeBron Elec. Works, 1 F. (2d) 313 (C. C. A. 8th,
1924); In re Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 88 F. (2d) 520 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937);
In re American Pile Fabric Co., 85 F. (2d) 961, 963 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1936); United
States v. Wiener, 210 Fed. 832, 834 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914), cited in St. Louis v.
St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 266 Mo. 694, 182 S. W. 750, 754 (1916).
60. See note 59, supra. Hooven, Owens & Rentschler Co. v. John Feather-
stone's Sons, 111 Fed. 81, 94 (C. C. A. 8th, 1901). In McCarthy Lbr. & Const.
Co. v. Kinder, 206 Mo. App. 287, 225 S. W. 1024, 1027 (1920), the court held
that bookcases and a skirt box, all built to fit particular spaces in a building were
fixtures.
61. In Kelvinator St. Louis, Inc. v. Schader, 225 Mo. App. 479, 39 S. W.(2d) 385, 388 (1931), the court held that a refrigerating plant was a complete
system and a fixture, and every part was necessary to the operation of the whole
plant, even though certain parts, as coils and condensors, are easily detached
without serious damage. In White v. Cincinnati, R. & M. R. R., 34 Ind. App.
287, 71 N. E. 276, 278 (1904), the court held the machinery of a paper mill was
part of the realty. In Banner Milling Co. v. New York, 240 N. Y. 533, 544, 148 N.
E. 668, 672 (1925), the court said: "The claimant is entitled to compensation, not
merely for so much land, so much brick, lumber, materials and machinery con-
sidered separately, but if they have been combined, adjusted, synchronized and
perfected into an efficient functioning unit of property, then it must be paid for
" as a going concern. In Los Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198, 25 P.
(2d) 826 (1933), all of the printing equipment of a metropolitan newspaper
[Vol. 6
13
Steiner: Steiner: Eminent Domain Damages
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1941
EMINENT DOMAIN DAMAGES
In determining whether an article is a fixture in condemnation pro-
ceedings, the courts, in St. Louis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry.,6 2 and in Los
Angeles v. Klinker,3 held that the rule between vendor and purchaser ap-
plied instead of the rule between landlord and tenant. This holding is
correct because the condemnor is a purchaser even though the sale is
enforced.
VII. APPRAISEMENT OF PROPERTY
In appropriating land, the uses to which it is plainly adapted must be
taken into consideration. Property is not to be regarded as worthless
or of a mediocre value because the owner allows it to go to waste or is
unable to put it to use. Another may be able to utilize a parcel of prop-
erty to the best use to which it is adaptable, and to such a use as may be
reasonably expected in the immediate future.64 Some courts very positive-
plant, the complete "processing equipment," was held to be a fixture for which
compensation was required to be made. In Jackson v. New York, 213 N. Y. 34,
35, 106 N. E. 758 (1914), the factory plant consisted of a warehouse which con-
tained machinery shafting, elevators, and conveyors, valued at $4,353.20. Judge
Cardozo, later Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, said:
"It is intolerable that the State, after condemning a factory or warehouse,
should surrender to the owner a stock of second-hand machinery and in so doing
discharge the full measure of its duty. Severed from the building, such machinery
commands only the prices of second-hand articles; attached to a going plant, it
may produce an enhancement of value as great as it did when new. The law
gives no sanction to so obvious an injustice as would result if the owner were
held to forfeit all these elements of value. An appropriation of land, unless
qualified when made, is an appropriation of all that is annexed to the land,
whether classified as buildings or as fixtures, and so it has frequently been held."
The unit idea of a complete system and fixture as well illustrated in Southern
California Tel. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 82 P. (2d) 422, 428 (Cal.
1938), where the central office equipment included articles as head-sets, breast-
sets, and operators' stools, which were readily portable and not attached by bolts
and screws to the building, were held to be fixtures as part of the whole equipment.
62. 266 Mo. 694, 182 S. W. 750, 754 (1916).
63. 219 Cal. 198, 25 P. (2d) 826, 831 (1933).
64. The most frequently cited authority in this point is Mississippi & Rum
River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, 408-9 (1878). There Patterson owned
one island and an interest in two other islands in the Mississippi River. It
appeared that these islands were ideally located for boom purposes and the Boom
Company sought to condemn them for said purposes. The jury awarded damages
in the sum of $9,358.33 and $300.00 of which was land value when not considering
the land for boom purposes. The court reduced the award to $5,500.00, and the
Boom Company appealed. In affirming the judgment the Supreme Court said:
"The inquiry in such cases must be what is the property worth in the market,
viewed not merely with reference to the uses to which it is at the time applied,
but with reference to the uses to which it is plainly adapted; that is to say,
what is it worth from its availability for valuable uses. Property is not to be
deemed worthless because the owner allows it to go to waste, or to be regarded
as valueless because he is unable to put it to any use. Others may be able to
use it, and make it subserve the necessities or conveniences of life. Its capability
of being made thus available gives it a market value which can be readily
estimated. . . . but, as a general thing, we should say that the compensation
to the owner is to be estimated by reference to the uses for which the property
is suitable, having regard to the existing business or wants of the community,
or such as may be reasonably expected in the immediate future. . . . Their
1941]
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ly hold that appraisers should take into consideration the highest and
best uses to which land is adapted. 5 Remote and speculative uses must
be excluded from all consideration.
In appraising property, rents may be introduced in evidence10 Rental
value as a basis for appraisements is not derogatory to the unit value rule
in the McCaskcW case. Generally property is worth what it produces,
although consideration must be given to the character of the improve-
ments in determining whether the property is serving its highest and
best uses and whether the property is producing its best return.
Sales of similar property, located in the same neighborhood and
made about the time in question, are admissible in evidence to aid in
determining the value of the property pending before the court."'
Valuable stone or minerals in the ground are not valued separately
from the land itself; such appraisements would be wholly speculative in
that there is no way of estimating the quantity and value of minerals in
the ground. The proper method of valuing such lands is to consider them
as containing minerals or stone deposits.68 After all, it is the land that
is being appraised, not the minerals.
Irregular parcels are often difficult to appraise. For example, an
owner might pay a "holdup" price for a strip one foot wide adjoining
adaptability for boom purposes was a circumstance, therefore, which the owner
had a right to insist upon as an element in estimating the value of his lands.
• . . The adaptability of the lands for the purpose of a boom was, therefore, a
proper element for consideration in estimating the value of the lands condemned."
Judge Brandeis in St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. v. United States, 279 U. S. 461,
503 (1929), said: ". . . such loss (in condemnation proceedings) must be
determined 'not merely with reference to the uses to which it is at the time
applied, but with reference to the uses to which it is plainly adapted.' Boom Co.
v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, 408."
65. In Yonts v. Public Serv. Co., 179 Ark. 695, 17 S. W. (2d) 886 (1929),
where the land was of little value as a farm, and was of great value as mineral
land or as a town site, the adaptable uses may be shown, although the land had
never been so used. See Illinois Light & Power Co. v. Bedard, 343 Ill. 618, 175 N.
E. 851, 852 (1931). In Joint Highway Dist. v. Ocean Shore R. R., 128 Cal. App.
743, 18 P. (2d) 413 (1933), it was held proper to consider the land available for
railroad purposes, although the proceedings were for highway purposes. Cf.
Webster v. Kansas City & So. Ry., 116 Mo. 114, 22 S. W. 474, 475 (1893).
66. St. Louis v. Rossi, 333 Mo. 1092, 64 S. W. (2d) 600, 607 (1933);
Chicago v. Lord, 276 Ill. 544, 576, 115 N. E. 8, 11 (1917); Ettlinger v. Weil,
184 N. Y. 179, 77 N. E. 31 (1906); Levenson v. Boston Elevated Ry., 191 Mass.
75, 77 N. E. 635 (1906).
67. St. Louis v. Buselaki, 336 Mo. 693, 80 S. W. (2d) 853, 856 (1935);
Forest Preserve Dist. v. Collins, 348 Ill. 477, 181 N. E. 345 (1932); Paducah
v. Allen, 111 Ky. 361, 63 S. W. 981 (1901); Wright v. Commonwealth, 286 Mass.
371, 190 N. E. 593, 594 (1934).
68. State ex rel. State Highway Comm. v. Cox, 336 Mo. 271, 77 S. W. (2d)
116, 119 (1934); St. Louis Belt & Terminal Ry. v. Cartan Real Estate Co., 204
Mo. 565, 103 S. W. 519 (1907); Department of Public Works & Buildings v.
Hubbard, 363 Ill. 99, 1 N. E. (2d) 383 (1936); Seattle & Montana R. R. v. Roeder,
30 Wash. 244, 70 Pac. 498, 505 (1902).
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his land, but that price would not represent market value. 9 Of course,
there is no absolute standard of appraising property. In the absence of
sales or rental information in the neighborhood, the nearest approach to
the value is the opinion of practical appraisers who are acquainted with
the property.70
In appraising property it must be borne in mind that "the owner of
property has the right to exercise exclusive dominion over it and to devote
it to such lawful uses as will best subserve his private and personal in-
terests and purposes. .. 1 This principle is particularly appropri-
ate in appraising restoration damages of remainder improvements, and is
well illustrated in the case of Chicago, Rook Island & Pacific Ry. v. Prig-
more,7 2 where it was urged, in order to avoid damages for cutting off access
to the front of the Prigmore lots, that he could have made an entrance on
the side of said lots which he had fenced prior to the damaging of his
property. The court held the owner had the right to fence the property
and could not be compelled to open an entrance on the side along Frisco
Avenue.
VIII. FEDERAL DECISIONS
The federal decisions call for applications of the measures of damages
to new situations. In Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston," the con-
demnor sought to acquire nearly 3,000 square feet of land-a private street
and way-in which area the Chamber of Commerce owned the fee, rather
the reversion, the Dock Corporation held the easement of way, light and
air over the land in question, and the Savings Bank held a mortgage on
the area subject to the easements. All parties agreed to combine their
interests, attempting to create a fee simple title, freed of the easements,
but the court said:
. . .the Constitution does not require a disregard of the
mode of ownership--of the state of the title. It does not require a
parcel of land to be valued as an unencumbered whole when it is
not held as an unencumbered whole. It merely requires that an
owner of property taken should be paid for what is taken from
him. It deals with the persons, not with the tracts of land."
69. Talbot v. Norfolk, 158 Va. 387, 163 S. E. 100, 101 (1932); Santa Ana
v. Brunner, 132 Cal. 234, 64 Pac. 287 (1901).
70. Texas-Empire Pipe Line Co. v. Stewart, 331 Mo. 525, 55 S. W. (2d)
283, 285 (1932).
71. Rhodes v. A. Moll Grocer Co., 231 Mo. App. 751, 95 S. W. (2d) 837,
841 (1936).
72. 180 Okla. 124, 68 P. (2d) 90, 92 (1937). On a question of cutting off
access this case was followed in Siemers v. St. Louis Electric Terminal Ry.,
343 Mo. 1201, 125 S. W. (2d) 865, 868 (1938).
73. 217 U. S. 189, 195 (1910).
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Perhaps the better statement is that the court took the land as it found
it, burdened with easements which had absorbed the substantial value
of the land, a situation very much like the one found in St. Louis v.
Clegg,74 where, in the condemnation of a private alley, the court held that
the damages were nominal for the reason that the substantial value had
been taken from the property by common law dedication. However the
damages in each instance were properly measured by what the owner had
lost and not by what the condemnor had gained.7
In Bauman v. Ross,76 it was held that if the remainder was left in such
shape or reduced in area as to be of less value, the owner was "entitled to
additional damages on that account." This damage is essentially con-
sequential, that is, direct and proximate, a depreciation in the market value
of the remainder. In Sharp v. United States, 77 where several separately
improved tracts were owned by one person and only one tract was taken,
a damage to the remaining tracts "was denied because there had been
no actual appropriation of any part of such separate parcels."
Likewise, where land is flooded there is an appropriation and there
may be a depreciation in the value of the remainder. In Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co.,78 the right to compensation grew out of the overflowing
of land by backwater from a dam erected in the Fox River to improve
navigation. The court held that where there is a flooding of land there
is a taking for which the owner is entitled to compensation. In United
States v. Lynah,79 the court held that where the dam erected in the Sa-
vannah River by the Government in aid of navigation, and which raised
the water above its natural height, backing the water up against the em-
bankment of plaintiff's property thereby destroying the land for planta-
tion purposes, there was a taking. The invasion of private property in
74. 289 Mo. 321, 233 S. W. 1, 5 (1921).
75. McCoy v. Union Elevated R. R., 247 U. S. 354, 366 (1918).
76. 167 U. S. 548, 574 (1897) ; Arkansas State Highway Comm. v. Kincannon,
193 Ark. 450, 100 S. W. (2d) 969, 970 (1937).
77. 191 U. S. 341, 353 (1903).
78. 13 Wall. 166 (U. S. 1871). This dam was constructed under the au-
thority of the State of Wisconsin. The project was permissible under the statelaw, in the absence of action by Congress, although the dam was constructed in
a navigable stream. See United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316, 324 (1917).
79. 188 U. S. 445 (1903). In King v. United States, 59 Fed. 9 (1893), a
rice plantation became unfit for rice culture because the backwater (from a
dam in the Savannah River) prevented drainage, although the owner for three
years attempted to grow rice. Some of the knolls or patches were still cultivated
by colored people. Held, the backing of the water upon the land was a taking;
that in order to constitute a taking it need not be taken in the narrowest sense
of the word. In Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166, 179 (U. S. 1871), the
court said: "The right of the mill owner to flow back the water has been repeatedly
placed on the ground that it was a taking of private property for public use."
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this case is distinguished from Scranton v. Wheeler, 0 where the Govern-
ment built a dike or pier upon submerged lands of a riparian owner thereby
cutting off access from his upland to the deep water of the St. Mary's
River, and it was held that the owner's qualified title was subject to the
public right of navigation.
In Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States,8' a lock and dam
and franchise to take tolls were condemned in the interest of navigation.
Said improvements were constructed under the authority of the state, but
also at the instance and the implied invitation of Congress. There the
court held the company was entitled to compensation under the Fifth
Amendment. This case is distinguished from United States v. Chandler-
Dunhar Water Power Co.,82 where the right of the Government to destroy
the water power of a riparian owner was upheld, and from Lewis Blue
Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs,8 3 where the allowance of compensa-
tion for the destruction of privately owned oyster beds was denied. The
last two cases were ruled on the theory that when one obtains a privilege
80. 179 U. S. 141, 163 (1900). In Jackson v. United States, 230 U. S. 1,
22 (1913), certain levees were constructed on the west bank of the Mississippi
River to prevent crevasses in aid of navigation. These levees, constructed in
the channel, raised the height of the river and flooded the plaintiff's land on the
east bank of the river. The court said this flooding was not an invasion nor a
direct taking but was merely a consequential damage. Another case of the same
class is that of Bedford v. United States, 192 U. S. 217, 225 (1904), where it was
held there was not a taking, where as a result of revetments, consisting of
willows and stone, constructed along the west bank of the Mississippi River, and
which were neither upon nor in contact with appellant's land. The lands affected,
which consisted of 2300 acres located six miles below the construction work, were
flooded and seriously damaged. The revetments were intended to prevent further
erosion and overflow. It was a matter of conjecture whether the improvements
caused the damage, as the court pointed out. The Scranton, Jackson and Bedford
cases, supra, belong to that class of case where improvements were made in the
river bed to keep the channel within due bounds in aid of navigation, a govern-
mental function.
81. 148 U. S. 312, 334 (1893). A similar case is that of Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, 430 (U. S. 1855), where the
company constructed over the Ohio River, under a Virginia statute, subject how-
ever, to the power of Congress to regulate the navigation of the river, the court
held the bridge was a nuisance, but before the orders of removal were executed
Congress declared the bridge a lawful structure.
82. 229 U. S. 53 (1913). The Chandler-Dunbar Company, under a permit
from the Secretary of War, constructed certain improvements in the bed of the
St. Mary's River, a navigable stream 3,000 feet long with an 18 foot fall, as a
power plant, within which area two-thirds of the volume of water constituting
the falls and rapids, flowed. Held, the flow of the stream was in no sense private
property hence no compensation was allowed therefor; that "every such struc-
ture in te water of a navigable stream is subordinate to the right of navigation."
The case of Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177 (1910), is
significant of the power of Congress over navigation. Certain alterations in
the bridge were ordered by the Secretary of War, under the Rivers and Harbors
Act. The condition of the bridge prevented the passage of rafts and steamboats
engaged in commerce. The Court held such changes were not such a taking
of private property as must be paid for under the Constitution.
83. 229 U. S. 82 (1913) ; see United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316, 320 (1917).
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from the state or nation to make use of a medium of interstate commerce,
subject to the dominant power of the Government, such permit may be
withdrawn without compensation.
In United States v. Welch,84 a part of the owner's farm was perma-
nently flooded, an outright taking for which it was agreed that he should be
paid. The rest of the farm was lessened in value because a private road
across the lands of others was cut off permanently, thereby depriving the
owner of access, the only outlet to Ford County road. Held, said easement
of way was property, being an appurtenance to the land taken and dam-
aged. Another leading case is United States v. Grizzard," where seven
and one-half acres were permanently flooded, hence a taking of plaintiff's
land, located on Tate's Creek, a tributary of the Kentucky River. Another
result of said dam was that the backwaters flooded an easement of access,
leading from Grizzard's farm to Tate's Creek pike, which flooding and
taking also depreciated the value of said farm, hence the court held the
plaintiff was entitled damages therefor, in the sense of an invasion, a taking.
In United States v. Cress,88 the district court found at the time of the
erection of the dam in the Cumberland River, the plaintiff owned about
seven acres on Whiteoak Creek, a non-navigable stream, which tract became
subject to frequent overflows on account of backwater from the dam,
thereby depreciating the land one-half of its value and destroying a ford
across Vhiteoak Creek and also part of a pass or way leading to Cress's
property. Held, the flooding was a direct invasion, a taking to the extent
of one-half of the value of said seven acres; that the "private way and
ford" were appurtenant to the Cress property, and for the destruction of
which he was entitled to damages to his land. This case came squarely
within th', holding of United States v. Welch, and United States v. Griz-
zard. Cress recovered damages on the theory that where there is a taking,
there is an implied promise87 to pay compensation. The court also found
that at the time of the erection of the dam in the Kentucky River the
plaintiff owned a tract of about five and one-half acres on Miller's Creek,
84. 217 U. S. 333 (1910).
85. 219 U. S. 180 (1911).
86. 243 U. S. 316 (1917). The court, in quoting from United States v.
Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, 470 (1903), said: ". . . where the government by the
construction of a dam or other public works so floods lands belonging to an
individual as to substantially destroy their value there is a taking within the
scope of the Fifth Amendment. While the government does not directly proceed
to appropriate the title, yet it takes away the use and value; when that is done it
is of little consequence in whom the fee may be vested."
87. The implied promise to pay under the Tucker Act (28 U. S. C. A. § 41
(20) ), is discussed in Campbell v. United States, 266 U. S. 368, 370 (1924).
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a tributary. The plaintiff had a mill on the tract and the backwater from
the dam, at pool stage, was about one foot below the crest of the mill-dam,
which flood prevented the drop in the current which ran the mill, thereby
destroying the mill. This destruction of the power that ran the mill was
held to be a taking of private property.
In Sanguinetti v. United States,88 the invasion was not conclusively
shown. There the Government built a canal and diversion dam for the
purpose of diverting waters from one river to another. The plaintiff's
land had been subject to. overflow, and the plaintiff contended that the
canal, being insufficient to carry the water, had increased the overflow,
thereby damaging plaintiff's farm and crops, but the extent to which the
overflow was increased was not shown. It must appear, the court said:
" . . that the overflow be the direct result of the structure,
and constitute an actual, permanent invasion of the land, amount-
ing to an appropriation of and not merely an injury to the proper-
ty. These conditions are not met in the present case."
The soundness of Christman v. United States89 has been questioned.
There the Government built a dam in the Ohio River which increased the
depth of the water above previous overflows about eight feet. The appel-
lants owned a 71-acre farm on Indian Creek, a tributary of the Ohio. It
appeared that the flooding of the farm was caused by "the joint action
of freshets coming down the tributary and meeting the backwater produced
by the dam in the Ohio river," but it appeared this situation had always
been true, and apparently the new dam had not affected the frequency of
the overflows. The district court found there were no damages as a
proximate 0 result of the new dam. Therefore, there was no taking of
property, and of course, there was no implied contract to pay damages
under the Tucker Act. Such damages were, therefore, merely consequen-
tial, sounding in tort, for which the Government is not liable.
88. 264 U. S. 146. 149 (1924). This case arose under the Tucker Act.
89. 74 F. (2d) 112, 114 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934). See United States v. Chicago,
B. & Q. R. R., 82 F. (2d) 131, 138 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936), and 90 F. (2d) 161, 168
(C. C. A. 7th, 1937) where the Christman case is discussed.
90. In Loiseau v. Arp, 21 S. D. 566, 572, 114 N. W. 701, 703 (1908), the
court said: ". . . damages are either direct or consequential. The former
are such as result from an act without the intervention of any intermediate
controlling or self-efficient cause. The latter are such as are not produced
without the concurrence of some other event attributable to the same origin or
cause." The freshet coming down Indian Creek under, the definition was the
intervention of a self-efficient cause. On page 573, 114 N. W. 703, the court also
said: "Proximate damages are those that are the ordinary and natural results
of the defendant's act, such as are usual, and might therefore have been expected.
Remote damages are such as are the result of accident or an unusual combination
of circumstances which could not be reasonably anticipated, and over which the
party sought to be charged had no control."
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Probably the most important federal condemnation case recently de-
cided by the courts is that of United States v. Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R. R.,91 where the dam and flood control cases are reviewed and
distinguished, and where the matter of proximate and remote damages is
given full consideration. In that case, the Government sought to condemn
a floodway easement on and over a portion of the right of way and rail-
road embankment of the appellee, which runs along the Mississippi River
above Hastings, Minnesota, on account of the construction of a dam in
said River in aid of navigation. The plan was to raise the water to an
elevation of 699 feet above the Memphis datum which elevation marked
a line on the embankment of appellee's roadbed about 3.45 feet below the
top of the railroad ties. As a result, twenty-four acres, situated along
about four miles of the appellee's track, was flooded. The pool which
contacted appellee's property was nearly two miles wide and about seven
miles long.
It was conceded by the parties that appellee was entitled to compensa-
tion for the twenty-four acres of land actually and permanently flooded.
Appellee claimed damages on account of the rise of the water at pool
stage, to the end that it might have as good and as safe a track after the
proceedings were finished as it had before; that it became necessary to
widen and elevate the railroad embankment to protect it against the
effects of saturation and wave action; to raise bridges and culverts to
prevent flooding and silting; and to riprap with rock its embankment to
protect it against erosion and distortion by waves and ice.
The court held as a fundamental proposition that the appellee had
the right to build its railroad along the bank of the river, a navigable
stream, and, in so doing, it had the right to rely upon the continued main-
tenance of the natural level and flow of the stream; that the right to in-
crease the water level, to the injury of the appellee above that established
by nature, could only be maintained by the appellant through the power of
eminent domain and the payment of just compensation.92
Matters giving rise to the main controversy were damages to the
remainder, a consequential damage, as used by Lewis,9 3 a direct and proxi-
91. 82 F. (2d) 131 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936). The Hastings dam was one of ten
dams authorized to be constructed in the Mississippi River near St. Paul, Minn.,
pursuant to act of Congress, Jan. 21, 1927 (44 Stat. 1010).
92. Id. at 134, citing United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445 (1903); United
States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316 (1917); United States v. Wheeler Township, 66
F. (2d) 977 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933).
93. LEwis, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. 1909) §§ 686, 710.
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mate damage as used by the court and defined as being "those which ac-
crue directly and in natural sequence, and as a specific (hurtful) result
from the act done, without the intervention of an independent cause." 94
It was pointed out that that rule in the federal courts had been in fair
accord with the rule, as given by Lewis. For example, in United States v.
Grizzard, it was held in addition to actual damages for the land invaded,
that the owner, on account of the destruction of the easement of access and
the corresponding depreciation in value of the farm, sustained a direct,
proximate damage.9 5 The court referred to the fact that neither Grizzard,
nor any other case cited, included all the specific damage elements involved
in the case at bar,96 which items included "the effect of saturation, waves,
and ice on the roadbed, track and right of way of appellee, and of silting
and backwater on culverts and bridges and tracks;" that all of these were
elements which, if paid for at all, had to be paid for in the pending action.9 7
All of these came from natural causes which were put into action by the
waters of the dam, hence the damages were direct and proximate, for which
loss and depreciation in value just compensation had to be paid. The
court said:
"We are impelled to the conclusion that the elements of
damage as to ice and wave action, saturation, and silting, and
expense of prevention, and protection, submitted to the jury were
proper and so exceptions to instructions embodying them were not
well taken."
"Just compensation," the court very forcibly pointed out, meant
that the "condemnee must be made whole for what is taken from him." 98
In damages that term meant such sum of money as would enable the
94. 82 F. (2d) 131, 136 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936); see notes 90 and 99, supra.
Consequential damages was used in Central Georgia Power Co. v. Mays, 137 Ga.
120, 124, 72 S. E. 900, 902 (1911), in the sense of a direct, natural, proximate
damage to the remainder.
95. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 574 (1897); United States v. Welch,
217 U. S. 333 (1910); Sharp v. United States, 191 U. S. 341, 354 (1903).
96. 82 F. (2d) 131, 136 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936).
97. The court refused to rule on the question whether the damage elements
in Christman v. United States, 74 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934); Jackson v.
United States, 230 U. 5. 1 (1913); and Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U. S.
146 (1924), came within the well settled definition of consequential damages, as
distinguished from direct and proximate damages. Such a ruling was not neces-
sary to the matters involved in the case, but the court said: "Confusion comes
from a failure to distinguish as to the origin of the independent cause. If the
latter arises from the act of another person and so could have been obviated
or prevented, or from natural causes acting abnormally, e. g. acts of God, damages
arising from the original act are not recoverable, for they are consequential
merely, and not proximate." Those cases arose under the Tucker Act where
the damages were held to be merely consequential and not proximate, and
where there was not an invasion, that is, a physical taking.
98. 82 F. (2d) 131, 140 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936). L.wis, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d
ed. 1909) § 686.
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railroad company to have "as good a track and as safe a track as it had
before condemnation."
The elements of damages in this case were, except for the twenty-
four acres of land taken, physical reconstruction of the railroad embank-
ment to withstand all of the effects of raising the water to a new elevation.
To call the reconstruction work the application of the market value rule
would be a mere fiction. With respect to the measure of damages where
the market value rule cannot be applied, as here, the court said:
"When the ordinary measure of loss (decrease in actual
or assumed 'market value') cannot be applied, as here, then 'what-
ever is necessary to be considered in order to determine what is an
equivalent for the appropriation of private property is germane to
the question of compensation.' "
The problem then is to determine what money loss the owner has suffered
by reason of the condemnation. In other words, the owner must be
paid such sum of money as will make him whole for what is taken from
him. 99
The recent case of United States v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R. R., 100 follows closely, both in point of facts and law, the preceding case
of the same style from the eighth circuit court of appeals. In this last
Burlington case, for the purpose of constructing the lock and dam in the
Mississippi River at Alma, Wisconsin, the Government filed two condem-
nation suits, later consolidated, to appropriate a tract of 1.6 acres, and a
flowage easement upon appellee's right of way. The area thereby affected
extended along and near the Mississippi River for a distance of twenty-
eight miles above the dam. In this area were two large sloughs: Beef
Slough near the dam, and Lake Pepin in the northern portion of the
damaged area. The tributary rivers entering the Mississippi in the flooded
district were Beef, Chippewa and Rush, with a combined drainage area
of more than 10,000 square miles. The construction of the dam called for
a crest elevation of 667 feet sea level datum. This elevation of the
water made necessary the elevation of the grade of the right of way, the
construction of new bridges, and of riprapping the embankment with
rock to prevent erosion. It was held that this construction work, being
the direct and proximate result of building the dam, constituted the elements
of damages to the appellee's property, that is, the flowage easement as it
99. Cf. notes 15 and 31, supra.
100. 90 F. (2d) 161 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 714 (1937).
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affected the remainder. In reaching this conclusion the court followed
United States v. Grizzard,'03 and applied the law as expressed as follows:
"Whenever there has been an actual physical taking of a part
of a distinct tract of land, the compensation to be awarded in-
cludes not only the market value of that part appropriated, but
the damage to the remainder resulting from that taking, embrac-
ing, of course, injury to the use to which the part appropriated is
to be devoted."
Here there was a physical appropriation together with an extensive dam-
age to the remainder of appellee's property, which damage was measured
by the construction cost necessary to restore the appellee's right of way
to its former usable condition. In Christman v. United States, there was
no appropriation, but as the trial court found, the flooding was the result
of freshets from adjacent hills and of backwater from the Ohio in times
of flood, and this same condition prevailed prior to the new dam. Hence
the damages were merely consequential and based upon tort for which
the Government is not liable. Held, that since the appellant was seeking
to condemn easements in lands to an elevation of 670 feet above sea level,
the appellee could not be limited by "an averment that the Government
did not intend to exercise its full right," and that compensation for the
railroad "must be based upon the maximum use of the right acquired;"
that the appellee was entitled to damages for elevating the water above
natural levels upon which riparian owners could rely,10 2 and erect their
improvements.
The most unusual case of all is that of Olson v. United States,03 where
the land in question had no market value and the owners received no
compensation. That land bordered on the Lake of the Woods, which is
located in Minnesota and Canada, and which has a surface of about 1,500
101. 219 U. S. 180, 183 (1911).
102. 90 F. (2d) 161, 170 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937); see case of same style, 82 F.(2d) 131, 134 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936). As to what are natural levels may be seen
in the following language: "The line of ordinary high water divides the upland
from the river bed. The river bed is the land upon which the action of the
water has been so constant as to destroy vegetation. It does not extend to
nor include the soil upon which grasses, shrubs and trees grow. Harrison v.
Fite, (C. C. A.) 148 F. 781. Beyond that point the Government can not go
without compensation for proximate damages." However, the rights of riparian
owners are partially governed by the laws of the states. For example, in State
ex rel. Citizens Elec. L. & P. Co. v. Longfellow, 169 Mo. 109, 69 S. W. 374, 377,
379 (1902), the court held: "A riparian owner is entitled to access to the waters
and to the use of the waters for all purposes not inconsistent with the public
right.of navigation thereon," but said right of navigation does not deprive the
riparian owner of the right of access. The riparian owner owns to low water
mark in Missouri.
103. 67 F. (2d) 24 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933), aff'd, 292 U. S. 246 (1934); see
also United States v. Wheeler Township, 66 F. (2d) 977 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933).
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square miles. In 1898 a Canadian power company built a dam in the
Winnipeg River in Canada, the only outlet of the Lake, thereby raising
the Lake level about three feet and flooding shore lands. By treaty between
the United States and Great Britain, it was agreed, among other things,
that the "flowage easement shall be permitted up to elevation 1064 sea
level datum upon all lands bordering on the Lake of the Woods," and
each nation assumed responsibility for damages to overflowed lands within
its borders.
Condemnation suits were filed pursuant to acts of Congress' 04 to
acquire flowage easements on shore lands, then for thirty years under
flowage by trespass. The court held that the measure of damage was
market value at the time of taking'05 contemporaneously paid in money.10
The land in question had adaptability for flowage purposes, but it had
no value as a flowage use. No one could use the land, and therefore no one
would buy it. Without prospective purchasers there can be no market
value. The case is probably without parallel in judicial history.
We are forced to the conclusion that although the decision is sound
under the law, nevertheless great injustice was done. The court said:
"The commissioners were not authorized to make any award on account
of damages caused by unlawful flooding of shore lands prior to the tak-
ing, ' 07 nor did Congress authorize a date of valuation prior to the unlaw-
ful flooding. Such a date of valuation would have been most unusual,
yet it would have afforded a remedy. The whole situation was an unfor-
tunate affair due to the fact that the shore lands had been unlawfully
flooded and taken for thirty years, during which time the property owners
were without a remedy.
IX. CONCLUSION
"Just compensation" is damages to property, actual and proximate,
that is, damages for property taken and for the depreciation of the re-
mainder (damaged); the same elements of damages apply to buildings
with this difference, however-in addition to the depreciation a building
sustains by reason of cutting off a portion thereof, the cost of restoration
104. Acts of Congress, May 22, 1926 (44 STAT. 617) and April 18, 1928 (45
STAT. 431). Also, Act of August 1, 1888 (40 U. S. C. A. §§ 247, 258).
105. Phelps v. United States, 274 U. S. 341, 344 (1927); Jacobs v. United
States, 290 U. S. 13, 17 (1933).
106. Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246, 255 (1934); Lmwis, EMINENT Do-
MAIN (3d ed. 1909) § 682.
107. Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246, 262 (1934).
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of a new front must be added as part of the damages to make the property
whole and usable. A property owner is made whole when he is paid a
sum of money that will put the property in the same condition after the
project is completed as it was in before. These principles apply with
even greater force to the damaging of remainder property, in the ordinary
change of grade, in grade separations, in the removal of lateral support,
or by reason of raising the water elevation in the dam and flood control
projects. The test is, what is the owner's loss or depreciation? Nothing
more, nothing less.
Due process of law requires that an owner shall receive just com-
pensation, the money equivalent for property taken and depreciated. Due
process of law also means that the owner shall receive due notice of the
proceedings and an opportunity to be heard in court. In other words, the
appellate courts require that the instrumentalities of the state must pro-
vide for due process of law.
The market value rule has been generally adopted by the courts to
measure just compensation, but that broad rule cannot be properly ap-
plied to all the varied conditions found in condemnation proceedings. For
example, no strained construction can make market value out of restora-
tion. Restoration is a distinct element of damages. If restoration costs
are to be limited by the value of the remainder property, there will be
times when owners are deprived of their property without due process of
law.
Private property under some circumstances does not have a market
value, yet, it has some value and the damages must be paid according to
the extent of the owner's loss and depreciation; absence of market value
does not absolve the condemnor from paying the actual value of the
owner's loss. By the payment of the actual losses, and restoration damages
in proper cases, the owner is made whole, justice done, and the constitution
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